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Abstract 
This paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward for why all the costs of investment 
management, both visible and hidden, should not ultimately be fully disclosed. They are after all 
genuine costs borne by the investor. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that hidden costs are 
at least as high as visible costs, if not much higher. Full transparency could be introduced in stages.  
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
On 13 May 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority criticised the investment management industry for 
not reporting charges to investors sufficiently clearly. In particular, it criticised the annual 
management charge (AMC) as failiŶg ͚to provide investors with a Đleaƌ, ĐoŵďiŶed figuƌe foƌ Đhaƌges͛.  
Instead, it recommended the use of an ongoing charges figure (OCF) which, in addition to the 
iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌ͛s fee, iŶĐludes ƌeĐuƌƌeŶt opeƌatioŶal Đosts, suĐh as keepiŶg a ƌegisteƌ of 
investors, calculating the value of the fuŶd͛s uŶits oƌ shaƌes, aŶd asset custody costs.  In other 
words, the OFC measures costs that an investment manager would pay in the absence of any 
purchases or sales of assets and if asset markets remained static during the year. The next day, on 14 
MaǇ, the FiŶaŶĐial ‘epoƌtiŶg CouŶĐil aĐĐepted the IŶǀestŵeŶt MaŶageŵeŶt AssoĐiatioŶ͛s ;IMAͿ 
proposal to report not only the OFC, but also all the dealing costs and stamp duty paid when an 
iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌ ďuǇs aŶd sells assets iŶ the fuŶd͛s poƌtfolio. IMA chief executive Daniel Godfrey 
said: ͚Our new measure is simple, easy-to-uŶdeƌstaŶd aŶd Đoǀeƌs eǀeƌǇ peŶŶǇ speŶt ďǇ a fuŶd…It 
will give investors confidence that nothing has been hidden.͛ 
 
Unfortunately, even with the new information reported, there will remain costs that are hidden. 
These are the indirect transaction costs for which investors pay via lower net returns. The size of 
these indirect costs depends on the asset classes involved and the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh the ĐlieŶt͛s assets 
are actively managed, but they could be material – even when investments are passively managed – 
and significantly affect the net return that the investor receives.  Most of these costs are currently 
not disclosed to investors.  
 
I address three important questions in this paper: (1) what are these costs?, (2) to what extent could  
they be disclosed currently?, and (3) in respect of which costs is further work required to allow 
disclosure on a cost-effective basis? 
2. The Indirect Costs of Investment Management 
The indirect costs of investment management can be divided into two types: visible (explicit) costs 
and hidden (implicit) costs 
One of the first studies to enumerate the hidden costs is Keim and Madhaven (1998). One estimate 
of the size of both sets of indirect costs was provided by the Plexus Group in 2005 and discussed in 
Madhavan et al.  (2007). The information was expressed in the form of an iceberg, with the visible 
costs shown above the water and the hidden costs are shown below the water (Figure 1). 
 
The Plexus iceberg breaks down the indirect costs as follows (with cost estimates derived from the 
Plexus Group study in 2005):1  
  visible costs (9 basis points of assets under management or 18% of total costs) 
o commissions 
o taxes 
                                                          
1 In a study of approximately 1,800 US equity mutual funds from 1995-2006, Edelen et al. (2013) report 
aggregate trading costs of 1.44% of assets under management compared with an expense ratio of 1.19%. So in 
their study, hidden costs account for 55% of total costs, while visible costs account for 45%. Bogle (2014, Table 
1) estimates aggregate trading costs of 1.15% of assets under management for US equity mutual funds 
compared with an expense ratio of 1.12%, a cost ratio of 51:49.  While in both studies the gap is narrower than 
the Plexus Group study, the hidden costs are still higher than the visible costs. 
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o fees 
o custodial charges 
o acquisition costs 
  hidden costs  (42 basis points of assets under management or 82% of total costs) 
o bid-ask spread 
o transactions costs in underlying funds 
o undisclosed revenue 
o market impact 
o information leakage 
o market exposure 
o missed trade opportunity or market timing costs 
o delay costs 
 
 
Figure 1: Plexus Iceberg 
 
Even the visible costs are not necessarily as straightforward as might first appear. Take, for example, 
the commissions charged by brokers when securities are purchased and sold. Investment managers 
ofteŶ get ͚fƌee͛ seƌǀiĐes iŶ eǆĐhaŶge foƌ this ĐoŵŵissioŶ, suĐh as ďƌokeƌ ƌeseaƌĐh, ŵaƌket data oƌ 
corporate access (to company managers).2 But these ͚fƌee͛ seƌǀiĐes aƌe aĐtuallǇ paid foƌ ďǇ the ĐlieŶt. 
The level of the services received increases with the level of business given to a broker, thereby 
pƌoǀidiŶg aŶ iŶĐeŶtiǀe to ĐhuƌŶ the ĐlieŶt͛s poƌtfolio. Fuƌtheƌ, iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌs fƌeƋueŶtly 
aggƌegate diffeƌeŶt ĐlieŶts͛ tƌades to get the ďest pƌiĐe. The aggƌegated tƌades ǁill go thƌough a 
particular broker which means that some of these clients will be indirectly paying for research from 
                                                          
2 It has ďeeŶ estiŵated that £ϱϬϬŵ of iŶǀestiŶg ĐlieŶts͛ fuŶds ǁas used to paǇ foƌ Đoƌpoƌate aĐĐess iŶ ϮϬϭϮ ;p. 
8, FTfm, 20 January 2014).   
 
Visible costs (15-20%) 
Hidden costs (80-85%) 
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which they get no benefit (for example, because the broker specialises in research about a segment 
of the market in which the client does not invest). Acquisition costs are transaction costs associated 
with purchases of assets other than bonds or equities such as the direct ownership of property. 
 
Of the hidden costs, the simplest to understand is the bid-ask spread that a dealer or market maker 
charges to buy and sell a security or an investment bank charges for, say, a currency hedge. The total 
spread costs incurred during the year will be related to portfolio turnover3 for that year.  
 
If the investment manager buys funds on behalf of the investor, the transactions costs incurred by 
these funds (as opposed to the explicit charges) are not currently reported even to the investment 
manager, but are still paid by the investor in terms of a lower net return.  
 
The investment manager might also benefit from undisclosed revenue, such as retained interest on 
underlying cash balances or retained profits from stock lending.4  
 
The other hidden costs are non-cash costs assoĐiated ǁith the aĐtiǀe ŵaŶageŵeŶt of aŶ iŶǀestoƌ͛s 
portfolio.  
 
Market impact refers to the reaction of the market price to a large transaction, such as a block sale 
of securities. The market price will fall in the process of selling the securities and the average 
execution price will be below the pre-sale price. If the investment manager attempts to execute a 
large transaction in smaller batches – e.g., by advertising trades to attract buyers or seeking 
indicators of interest – this will lead to information leakage and will have broadly the same effect as 
market impact.  
 
Market exposure refers to the fact that an investor is exposed to what is happening in the market 
during the period that the transaction is taking place. Suppose the investment manager is planning 
to buy securities for a client. The client is exposed to the risk that the market price rises before the 
transaction is executed.  
 
Missed trade opportunity or market timing costs are the costs associated with not executing a 
transaction at the best possible price.  Finally, there are delay costs associated with waiting for 
transactions to complete (e.g., holding the purchase price in a zero-interest account). Some of these 
non-cash costs can be hedged against – e.g., those relating to adverse market movements – but the 
cost of the hedge then becomes an explicit measure of the hidden cost. 
 
                                                          
3 Portfolio turnover is the percentage of the securities in an investment portfolio that are bought and sold 
during the year.  One method to calculate it is to take the smaller of the sum of the values of all securities 
purchased during the year and the sum of the values of all securities sold during the year and divide the result 
by the average value of the fund during the year. Another is to take 50% of the sum of the values of all 
securities purchased during the year plus 50% of the sum of the values of all securities sold during the year and 
divide the result by the average value of the fund during the year.  The IMA is working on a common standard 
for calculating the portfolio turnover rate. 
4 It is arguable that undisclosed revenue should be treated as a reduction in return rather than a cost, but for 
compatibility with the other items, we treat it as a cost. 
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Figure 1 shows that the visible costs are estimated at 15-20% of the total indirect costs, while the 
hidden costs are estimated at 80-85%. The hidden costs are therefore of material significance.  This 
has been confirmed by the following studies: Keim and Madhaven (1997), which showed the 
economic significance of trading costs; Keim and Madhaven (1996), which showed the economic 
significance of price movements prior to trade dates; and Keim and Madhaven (1995), which showed 
the economic significance of the opportunity costs associated with the delays in executing large 
orders. To reiterate, all these costs are in addition to the explicit costs including the AMC. 
 
The extent of the transaction costs incurred will be highly correlated with the number of 
transactions.5 This is why it should be good practice to reveal the portfolio turnover rate. This is 
required in the United States. It was previously a recommendation of the Investment Management 
Association (IMA) in the UK, but has been removed from the draft IMA Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP) ͚Financial Statements of Authorised Funds͛.6 
 
3. Which Costs Could Be Disclosed 
All the indirect costs listed in the previous section relate to the efficiency of the investment 
management process and all good investment managers should have an estimate of their size. 
Nevertheless, some of the costs are easier to estimate than others. 
The following indirect costs should be straightforward to collect or estimate from the information 
collected by the iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌ͛s oǁŶ sǇsteŵs: 
 visible cash costs (which I denote as Level 1 costs) 
o commissions 
o taxes 
o fees 
o custodial charges 
o acquisition costs 
  hidden cash costs (which I denote as Level 2 costs) 
o the bid-ask spread7  
o transactions costs in underlying funds 
o undisclosed revenue 
 
Commissions, taxes, fees, custodial charges and acquisition costs are cash costs that have to be 
explicitly paid out and undisclosed revenue items will be paid into the iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌ͛s oǁŶ 
account.  
 
                                                          
5 Bryant and Taylor (2012, Chart 1) report an approximately linear relationship between transactions costs and 
the portfolio turnover rate: a 50% annual portfolio turnover rate costs on average 0.2% of assets under 
management, while a 250% annual portfolio turnover rate costs on average 0.8% of assets under 
management. 
6  http://www.investmentfunds.org.uk/policy-and-publications/sorp-2013/ 
7
 Gilts and foreign exchange aƌe tƌaded ͚ĐoŵŵissioŶ-fƌee͛ iŶ the UK, so for these items we need to apportion 
the spread between commission (and include this in Level 1) and the pure spread.  
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The item ͚bid-ask spread͛ could be calculated at the same time as portfolio turnover is calculated, so 
long as the bid-ask spread for each security is collected at the time a security is purchased. 
Alternatively, the investment manager could use the spreads at the time of disposal (which would 
still provide a reliable estimate if spreads do not vary much over time – which seems a reasonable 
assumption to make in normal market conditions).8  
 
The item ͚transactions costs in underlying funds͛ is no more than the same information as above, but 
provided by the investment managers of the underlying funds. Failing to report transaction costs in 
underlying funds clearly potentially permits the bypass of any regime for the declaration of 
transaction costs.    
The following indirect costs are non-cash costs and would be more challenging to calculate, since 
they involve the analysis of information that might not be automatically captured by the investment 
ŵaŶageƌ͛s oǁŶ sǇstems: 
 hidden non-cash costs (which I denote as Level 3 costs) 
o market impact 
o information leakage 
o market exposure 
o missed trade opportunity or market timing costs 
o delay costs 
Nevertheless, there are organisations that specialise in advising investment managers on the 
efficiency of their investment processes which can obtain this information for a fee. One such 
organisation is Novarca, a Swiss-based consultancy.  
Objections to Full Disclosure 
A number of objections have been put forward. 
It has been argued that full disclosure is technically impracticable or too expensive 
 
Industry insiders have informed me that one of the problems with disclosure in the UK is that many 
UK investment managers have not got the software in place to provide the Level 2 costs discussed 
above. However, other industry insiders say that the costs of putting software in place to make Level 
2 costs transparent would not be high.  
Dealing with Level 3 is certainly more difficult. Estimates of Level 3 costs can already be made by 
specialist consultants. The issue is whether fund manager systems could be configured to generate 
similar information on a cost-efficient basis. This needs to be established in a reasonable timeframe 
and with involvement of parties beyond those which may face a conflict of interest. An alternative, 
possibly as an interim measure, might be periodic audits by external consultants. 
                                                          
8 In this Đase, the ͚ďid-ask spƌead͛ iteŵ ǁould ďe  eƋual to the smaller of the sum of the spreads on all 
securities purchased during the year and the sum of the spreads on all securities sold during the year. It could 
be expressed as a rate by dividing by the average value of the fund during the year (evaluated using mid-
market prices, i.e., the average of the bid and ask prices). 
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Partial disclosure is all that is needed 
  
The IMA draft SORP,9 which was approved by the Financial Reporting Council on 14 May 2014, 
proposes that fund managers should declare the following transaction costs: transfer taxes, 
commission (execution), commission (research), and, amounts recovered on units issued and 
cancelled. However, it does not recommend publication of the following transaction costs: the 
transaction costs incurred by underlying funds, the profits made by funds when stock-lending is 
undertaken, and interest retained by fund managers on cash balances. Nor does it suggest explicit 
publication of the portfolio turnover rate.  On bid-ask spread, it says ͚An estimate of the average 
portfolio dealing spread on the balance sheet date should also be given͛, ďut it is Ŷot Đleaƌ hoǁ this 
figure can be used to estimate the total spread costs incurred during the year due to portfolio 
turnover.  
 
There are no standard definitions and measurements of transaction costs 
The UK industry has no common and binding approach to standard definitions and measurements of 
transaction costs. However, this collective action problem is now being tackled by the UK 
government. In Better Workplace Pensions: Further Measures for Savers10of March 2014, the UK 
government set out its intended approach to developing common standards for the declaration of 
tƌaŶsaĐtioŶ Đosts iŶĐuƌƌed ďǇ ǁoƌkplaĐe peŶsioŶs͛ iŶǀestŵeŶts (p.87): 
 
From 2015, trustee boards and Independent Governance Committees will have new duties to 
consider and report on costs and charges, and pension schemes and providers should start 
making progress immediately in these areas. 
 
Thereafter, the Government will introduce new requirements to standardise the disclosure of 
administration charges and transaction costs, making this the first international example of 
full transparency in pension schemes.  
 
The Government will start work immediately with regulators, providers, trustees and asset 
managers on the design and implementation of the relevant standards and products to 
ensure maximum effectiveness of these transparency measures. 
 
A voluntary standard for the disclosure of pension charges and costs was introduced in the 
Netherlands in 2011.11 The initiative is being led by the Federation of Dutch Pension Funds and has 
the support of the Dutch Central Bank, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board, the Netherlands 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (NBA), and the Dutch Asset Management Association. While the 
initial transaction costs reported did not cover all of the Level 1 to Level 3 costs I identify above, the 
stated ultimate objective of the Federation of Dutch Pension Funds is full transparency of 
                                                          
9 See http://www.investinginfunds.org/assets/20120628_EnhancedChargesDisclosureGuidance.pdf  
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/298436/better-
workplace-pensions-march-2014.pdf. 
11 Federation of Dutch Pension Funds (2011, p.87), Recommendations on Administrative Costs, 
http://www.pensioenfederatie.nl/Document/Publicaties/Servicedocumenten/Aanbevelingen_uitvoeringskoste
n_2013_herziene_versie.pdf. 
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transactions costs. Currently there is discussion in the Dutch parliament about adopting legislation on 
disclosing transaction costs in early 2015.12 
Costs cannot be considered in isolation 
Some have argued that costs cannot be considered independently of the underlying investment 
strategy.13 This means that costs should only be considered along with risk, expected return and 
portfolio turnover. However, this does not prevent costs being declared on a backward-looking 
basis. This would mean they would be directly comparable with the realised returns and portfolio 
turnover rate.  
Investors cannot deal with complexity 
Presentation of transaction costs and of the portfolio turnover rate does not have to be complex and 
can be tailored differently for different audiences. The point of providing the information is that it 
permits not just those investors who can use the information from undertaking comparisons, but 
also interested third parties.  As Lord Lawson put it in the House of Lords: ͚There are sections of the 
press that give excellent consumer advice on financial matters, and not just the press: there is the 
excellent Paul Lewis, with his Money Box programme on the wireless. All these people need the 
information. They need to be the beneficiaries of disclosure if they are to be as effective as they 
might be for the benefit of members of pension schemes.͛14 
4. Support for Full Disclosure 
I would argue that the principle of full transparency is paramount. Further, there is little point in 
requiring transparency where the reported measure for ͚costs͛ does not include all of the costs, or in 
the short term, as many as could currently be reported on a cost-effective basis. 
This view is supported by a number of professionals interviewed on an anonymised basis in the 
recent Pensions Institute report VfM: Assessing Value for Money in Defined Contribution Default 
Funds (see Harrison, Blake and Dowd (2014)): 
 ͚Schemes and asset managers are boasting that they are so low cost theǇ ĐaŶ͛t ŵake a 
profit. This is nonsense – all that low charges tell us is that the real asset management costs 
are going out of the funds before the member charge is extracted͛. Independent consultant  ͚A charge cap on an incomplete disclosure measure would not just be pointless, it would 
actively encourage greater opacity at fund level and drive bad practice in the asset 
management community͛. Employee benefit consultant   ͚If all Đhaƌges eaƌŶed aƌe Ŷot iŶĐluded iŶ the Đhaƌges Đap, it is easǇ to see fuŶd managers 
using alternative sources of revenue [e.g. soft commissions], as well as stock-lending, to 
                                                          
12 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/02/26/tweede-nota-van-
wijziging-wet-verlaging-maximumopbouw-en-premiepercentages-pensioenen.html. 
13 For example, Bryant and Taylor (2012). 
14 Lord Lawson, Hansard at column 958, House of Lords Official Report, Vol. 752, No. 119, Wednesday 26 
February 2014.  
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replace the fees lost from a reducing AMC. It will be hard for fiduciaries to either see this 
going on or do much about it. We should not underestimate the ingenuity of the financial 
services industry. Any opportunity for a loophole will be taken, so it is important that a 
͚Đoǀeƌ-all͛ Đlause is iŶseƌted iŶ legislatioŶ that addƌesses ďoth the spiƌit as ǁell as the 
speĐifiĐs of the legislatioŶ͛. Employee benefit consultant   ͚Most [active] funds over-trade. There should be a fee structure that dissuades fund 
managers from trading unnecessarily. Where I am really uncertain is in the murky world of 
broking. We never get involved with that side of the industry. Are they [brokers] any good? 
Are their fees sensible or reasonable? Is competition effective in that area? Why do fund 
managers bother taking their research – shouldŶ͛t theǇ ďe doiŶg theiƌ oǁŶ? The failuƌe to 
ŵaŶage tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal Đost at the fuŶd leǀel … pƌovides a compelling case for Government 
intervention͛. Employee benefit consultant  ͚We Ŷeed to ĐhalleŶge eǀeƌǇ ďasis poiŶt iŶ that ŵeŵďeƌ Đhaƌge aŶd ask ǁhetheƌ it deliǀeƌs 
ǀalue to ŵeŵďeƌs͛. Asset manager  ͚There is no technical obstacle to reporting the portfolio turnover rate͛ Fund Manager 
 
Supporters of full disclosure also include: 
  The Pensions Regulator in its Regulatory Guidance for Defined Contribution Schemes 
;Noǀeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϯͿ states that ;p.ϭϮͿ: ͚In a quality scheme, trustees will ensure that all costs 
and charges borne by members are transparent and communicated clearly at point of 
selection to the employer to enable value for money comparisons to be made and to assess 
the faiƌŶess to ŵeŵďeƌs of the Đosts aŶd Đhaƌges͛.15  The Office of Fair Trading in its Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study 
;“epteŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϯ, ƌeǀised FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϰͿ states ;p. ϭϴͿ: ͚ǁe aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that ŶoŶ-visible 
charges add to the potential for conflicts of interest to emerge in the supply chain such that 
charges may not always be managed down in the interests of scheme members. While we 
have not received specific evidence of inflated transaction charges, a number of industry 
experts have pointed to the potential for conflicts to exist. Disclosure of transaction costs 
and independent scheme governance could help to ensure that this potential conflict of 
iŶteƌest is ŵaŶaged͛.16   The Work and Pensions Select Committee of the House of Commons which has re-opened its 
inquiry into governance and best practice in workplace defined contribution pension 
sĐheŵes aŶd oŶe of the keǇ poiŶts that it ǁill foĐus oŶ is the ͚tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ of Đhaƌges aŶd 
Đosts͛17   A cross-bench group of MPs has sent a letter to the Financial Reporting Council requesting 
the F‘C ͚to eŶsuƌe that the aĐĐouŶtiŶg staŶdaƌds eŵploǇed ďǇ fuŶd ŵaŶageƌs are accurate 
aŶd faiƌ…..A..ƌegiŵe that Đlaiŵs to disĐlose tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs Đosts, ďut oŵits ŵajoƌ tǇpes of 
transactions costs does Ŷot ŵeet these ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts͛18  
                                                          
15 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/guidance/guidance-dc-schemes.aspx 
16 http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-studies/oft1505  
17 Reported in Professional Pensions, 19 October 2013. 
18 Reported in the Financial Times, 10 November 2013. 
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 AdƌiaŶ BouldiŶg, peŶsioŶs stƌategǇ diƌeĐtoƌ at Legal & GeŶeƌal has stated that ͚a Đost is a 
Đost aŶd theǇ all dƌag oŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ fuŶds͛19   Loƌd Fƌeud, suppoƌtiŶg the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s aŵeŶdŵeŶt to ƌeƋuiƌe the puďliĐatioŶ of 
transaction costs in the House of Lords said: ͚...the full range of transaction costs that may 
be borne by [pension] scheme members should be disclosed.͛ 20  Lord Turner: ͚Although a price cap on explicit costs is important, it is not sufficient. That is 
why I strongly support the sentiment of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, 
which seeks to cover all the other costs which are not covered in explicit fund management 
charges. The issue of these other costs was also one with which the Pensions Commission 
was concerned. We were concerned that, beyond what you can see in an annual 
management charge for a fund, there are lots of other costs involved. These are precisely 
the sort of costs described in Amendment 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, 
which include fees and performance fees paid to investment managers ... commissions and 
bid-offer spreads paid ... fees, revenue splits and bid-offer spreads paid to custodian banks. 
These are very significant but are not well understood. On the Pensions Commission, we 
sought to see whether research had been done on how big these were. Interestingly, there 
was one piece of research, which was sponsored by the FSA back in 2000 and written, after a 
lot of research, by a man called Kevin James.21 It tried to work out just how large these other 
costs were in the UK and in the US. We called them implicit costs in addition to explicit costs. 
There is a box in the first Pensions Commission report which explains that piece of analysis 
and how big they are. His analysis, which we interpreted, suggested that some of these costs 
might be as high as 90 basis points, on top of the overt, explicit costs. We ended up, for the 
purposes of modelling, believing that if we were to try to understand what got lost between 
the gross return on equities that you see by looking at the FTSE All-Share Index every year 
and what the saver gets, we had to allow, in addition to the explicit asset management 
costs, for 65 basis points on average going in these implicit costs – more for actively 
managed funds, less for index funds. It is possible that those costs have come down since 
that analysis was done and since we looked at it – there has, for instance, been some 
compression of bid-offer spreads – but they are sufficiently large that it is incredibly 
important to focus on them, pay attention to them and, as it were, bring the disinfectant of 
transparency to bear on this bit of the cost base. Let us suppose that they were 65 basis 
points. That means that if somebody thought that they were paying 0.85% on an explicit 
annual management charge, between the gross return on equities in the market and what 
they actually get, they would be paying 85 basis points plus 65 basis points, which takes us 
back to the 1.5% per annum, which is 34% of their pot disappearing.͛22 
                                                          
19 Quoted in the Financial Times, 10 November 2013. 
20 Lord Freud, Hansard at column 956, House of Lords Official Report, Vol. 752, No. 119, Wednesday 26 
February 2014.  
21 James (2000). 
22 Lord Turner, Hansard at column 966, House of Lords Official Report, Vol. 752, No. 119, Wednesday 26 
February 2014.  
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 The European Commission which, in April 2014, announced that it was introducing a new 
disĐlosuƌe ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt uŶdeƌ the “haƌeholdeƌs͛ ‘ights DiƌeĐtiǀe to ŵake iŶstitutioŶal 
investors, such as pension funds, disclose publicly how they pay asset managers.23 
 
5. Conclusion 
I would argue that no good reasons have been put forward for why all the costs of investment 
management, both visible and hidden, should not ultimately be fully disclosed. They are after all 
genuine costs borne by the investor. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that hidden costs are 
at least as high as visible costs, if not much higher. Full transparency could be introduced in stages.  
First, the following indirect cash costs could be reported in the form of ďoth a ͚ƌate of Đost͛ – which 
could then be deducted from the gross rate of return to give a net rate of return – and as a 
monetary amount – ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ theŶ ďe Đoŵpaƌed ǁith the ŵoŶetaƌǇ ǀalue of the iŶǀestoƌ͛s 
portfolio: 
 visible cash costs (Level 1 costs) 
o commissions 
o taxes 
o fees 
o custodial charges 
o acquisition costs  hidden cash costs (Level 2 costs) 
o bid-ask spread 
o transactions costs in underlying funds 
o undisclosed revenue 
TheŶ, oŶĐe iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaŶageƌs͛ sǇsteŵs ĐaŶ Đope, the folloǁiŶg iŶdiƌeĐt ŶoŶ-cash costs could be 
estimated and reported in the same form: 
 hidden non-cash costs (Level 3 costs) 
o market impact 
o information leakage 
o market exposure 
o missed trade opportunity or market timing costs 
o delay costs 
Further work is required to allow disclosure of Level 3 costs. The Government should announce that 
Level 3 costs will be investigated within a set period with proposed solutions to be subject to a cost-
benefit analysis at the end of that period.  
                                                          
23 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396_en.htm; 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexa_en.htm. 
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If total investment costs are not ultimately disclosed in full, then this leaves two open questions: (1) 
how can there ever be an effective and meaningful cap on charges? and (2) how can active 
investment managers ever assess their true valued added? 
References 
Bogle, J. ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚The AƌithŵetiĐ of ͞All-IŶ͟ IŶǀestŵeŶt EǆpeŶses͛, FiŶaŶĐial AŶalǇsts JouƌŶal, ϳϬ;ϭͿ, 
13-21, January/February. 
Bryant, C., and Taylor, G. (2012) Fund Management Charges, Investment Costs and Performance, 
Investment Management Association, Statistics Series Paper 3, May. 
EdeleŶ, ‘., EǀaŶs, ‘., aŶd KadleĐ, G. ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ͚“heddiŶg Light oŶ ͞IŶǀisiďle͟ Costs: TƌadiŶg Costs aŶd 
Mutual FuŶd PeƌfoƌŵaŶĐe͛, FiŶaŶĐial AŶalǇsts JouƌŶal, ϲϵ;ϭͿ, 33-44, January/February. 
Harrison, D., Blake, D., and Dowd, K. (2014) VfM: Assessing Value for Money in Defined Contribution 
Default Funds, Pensions Institute, Cass Business School, London.  
 
James, K. (2000) The Price of Retail Investing in the UK, Financial Services Authority, Occasional Paper 
Series 6, February. 
Keim, D., aŶd MadhaǀeŶ, A. ;ϭϵϵϱͿ ͚AŶatoŵǇ of the TƌadiŶg PƌoĐess: EŵpiƌiĐal EǀideŶĐe oŶ the 
Behaǀiouƌ of IŶstitutioŶal Tƌades͛, Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 371-398. 
 
Keiŵ, D., aŶd MadhaǀeŶ, A. ;ϭϵϵϲͿ ͚The Upstaiƌs Maƌket foƌ Laƌge-Block Transactions: Analysis and 
MeasuƌeŵeŶt of PƌiĐe EffeĐts͛, Review of Financial Studies, 9, 1-36. 
 
Keiŵ, D., aŶd MadhaǀeŶ, A. ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ͚TƌaŶsactions Costs and Investment Style: An Inter-Exchange 
Analysis of IŶstitutioŶal EƋuitǇ Tƌades͛, Journal of Financial Economics, 46, 265-292. 
 
Keiŵ, D., aŶd MadhaǀeŶ, A. ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ͚The Cost of IŶstitutioŶal EƋuitǇ Tƌades͛, Financial Analysts 
Journal, 54(4), 50-69 
 
Madhavan, A., Treynor, J.L., and Wagner, W.H. (2007Ϳ ͚Execution of Portfolio Decisions, in Managing 
Investment Portfolios: A Dynamic Process ,edited by Maginn, J. L., Tuttle, D.L., McLeavey, D. W., and 
Pinto, J. E. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken (Chapter 10, pp.637-681).  
 
